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What is Coordination Theory?
The primary purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussion about a research agenda for a new
interdisciplinary field. This field--the study of coordination--draws upon a variety of different
disciplines including computer science, organization theory, management science, economics, and
psychology. Work in this new area will include developing a body of scientific theory, which we will
call "coordination theory," about how the activities of separate actors can be coordinated. One
important use for coordination theory will be in developing and using computer and communication
systems to help people coordinate their activities in new ways. We will call these systems
"coordination technology."
Rationale
There are four reasons why work in this area is timely:
(1) In recent years, large numbers of people have acquired direct access to computers. These
computers are now beginning to be connected to each other. Therefore, we now have, for the
first time, an opportunity for vastly larger numbers of people to use computing and
communications capabilities to help coordinate their work. For example, specialized new
software has been developed to (a) support multiple authors working together on the same
document, (b) help people display and manipulate information more effectively in face-to-face
meetings, and (c) help people intelligently route and process electronic messages. It already
appears likely that there will be commercially successful products of this new type (often
called "computer supported cooperative work" or "groupware"), and to some observers these
applications herald a paradigm shift in computer usage as significant as the earlier shifts to
time-sharing and personal computing. It is less clear whether the continuing development of
new computer applications in this area will depend solely on the intuitions of successful
designers or whether it will also be guided by a coherent underlying theory of how people
coordinate their activities now and how they might do so differently with computer support.
(2) In the long run, the dramatic improvements in the costs and capabilities of information
technologies are changing--by orders of magnitude--the constraints on how certain kinds of
communication and coordination can occur. At the same time, there is a pervasive feeling in
American business that the pace of change is accelerating and that we need to create more
flexible and adaptive organizations. Together, these changes may soon lead us across a
threshhold where entirely new ways of organizing human activities become desirable. For
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example, new capabilities for communicating information faster, less expensively, and more
selectively may help create what some observers have called "adhocracies"--rapidly changing
organizations with highly decentralized networks of shifting project teams. As another
example, lowering the costs of coordination between firms may encourage more market
transactions (i.e., more "buying" rather than "making") and, at the same time, closer
coordination across firm boundaries (such as "just in time" inventory management). To
understand and take advantage of these new possibilities will almost certainly require major
extensions or reformulations of our current theories of organizations, of markets, and of
management.
(3) Much recent activity in computer science has involved the exploration of a variety of parallel
processing computer architectures. In many ways, physically connecting the processors to
each other is easy compared to the difficulty of coordinating the activities of many different
processors working on different aspects of the same problem. An intriguing possibility here is
that lessons learned about how large groups of people coordinate their work can be applied to
coordinating large groups of computer processors.
(4) Finally, in addition to these essentially practical applications, there appears to be a growing
recognition of the commonality of theoretical problems in a variety of different disciplines
that deal with the coordination of separate actors. For example, organization theorists and
economists have found concepts about information processing useful in analyzing human
coordination, and computer scientists have used economic and other social concepts in
designing and analyzing parallel and distributed computer systems. In some cases, these
cross-disciplinary connections offer the possibility of more precise analytical tools (e.g.,
computational models of human organizations or economic models of distributed computing).
In other cases, they offer the possibility of rich new metaphors and concepts for analysis (e.g.,
"blackboard" models of information transfer in markets or "task forces" in distributed
computing systems). One of the intriguing aspects of this interdisciplinary approach is the
possibility of exploiting parallels between: (a) coordinating groups of people, (b) coordinating
groups of computer processors or program modules, and (c) coordinating "hybrid" groups that
include both people and computers.
For this enterprise to succeed, a great deal of cross-disciplinary interaction is needed. As Figure 1
suggests, abstract theories of coordination can apply to: (a) designing human organizations, (b)
designing new technologies to help people coordinate their work, and (c) designing parallel and
distributed processing computer systems. This is not, however, simply a matter of empirically
studying human organizations to test theoretically motivated hypotheses, or using abstract theory to
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design new computer systems. We also expect that empirical insights or provocative new sytems will
stimulate new theory, and that concepts from one domain will lead to applications in another (e.g.,
analogies between computer systems and human organizations). In each of these instances, the
abstractions of coordination theory are the key intellectual links that facilitate such connections.
Theory
Applications
Figure 1
Coordination theory and applications
In the remainder of this paper, we will define what we mean by coordination theory and coordination
technology, and then briefly suggest elements of a research agenda in this new area.
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COORDINATION THEORY
What is coordination?
When multiple actors pursue goals together, they have to do things to organize themselves that a
single actor pursuing the same goals would not have to do. We call these extra organizing activities
coordination. More precisely, we define coordination as the additional information processing
performed when multiple, connected actors pursue goals that a single actor pursuing the same goals
would not perform.
Components of coordination. This definition of coordination implies the following components: (1) a
set of (two or more) actors, (2) who perform tasks, (3) in order to achieve goals (cf. Malone, 1987;
Malone & Smith, in press; Baligh & Damon, 1980: Baligh & Burton, 1981: Baligh, 1986). For
example, an automobile manufacturing company might be thought of as having a set of goals (e.g.,
producing several different lines of automobiles) and a set of actors (people and machines) who
perform the tasks that achieve these goals. As another example, a computer network can be thought
of as having a set of goals (computations to be performed) and a set of computer processors of various
types that perform the tasks that achieve these goals.
Coordination is in 'the eye of the beholder." It is important to realize that the components of
coordination are analytic concepts imposed by an observer. Thus, it is possible to analyze the same
physical actions in different ways for different purposes. For instance, we might sometimes regard
each person in a work group as a separate actor while at other times, we might regard the whole
group as a single actor. Sometimes, we might even regard different parts of the brain of a single
person as separate actors (e.g., Minsky, 1987).
Similarly, in order to analyze coordination, an observer must have some idea of what goal the
activities help achieve. The actors themselves, however, may not all have the same goals or even
have any explicit goals at all. For instance, in a market, we might regard the goal to be achieved as
one of optimally allocating resources to maximize consumer utilities (e.g., Debreu, 1959). Even
though no single individual has this goal, an observer might evaluate market coordination in terms of
how well it achieved this goal.
Coordination is distinguished from production. Even if all three of the above components are present,
not all activities in a situation are coordination. We divide the goal-relevant tasks into two
categories: coordination tasks and production tasks. Coordination tasks are the information
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processing tasks that are performed because more than one actor is involved. Production tasks are all
the other tasks that are performed in order to achieve the goals (e.g., Jonscher, 1982, 1983).
For instance, in a computer system solving a mathematical optimization problem using parallel
processing, the mathematical computations that are necessary to solve the problem are the
production tasks, while the other computing and communications activities--assigning and
transmitting subparts of the problem to different processors--are the coordination tasks.
As another example, in an automobile manufacturing company, we can view the physical fabrication
and assembly of automobiles as production tasks and all the other communication and decision-
making necessary to produce automobiles as coordination tasks. In this sense, 'coordination" is
roughly synonymous with "management." Coordination, however, has several advantages as an
analytic concept here. For instance: (1) it gives a powerful "analytic grip" by immediately implying
components such as goals and multiple actors, and (2) it encompasses an intellectually coherent set of
phenomena that appear in many domains (e.g., markets, committees, computers), not just
hierarchical organizations.
What is coordination theory?
We define coordination theory as a body of principles about how the activities of separate actors can be
coordinated. A test of the generality of a concept or principle is whether it can apply to more than one
kind of actor. For instance, as the above examples suggest, at least some of the principles of
coordination theory should be general enough to apply to a wide variety of different kinds of actors,
including: organizations, individual people, computer processors, and parts of individual brains. We
will focus our primary attention here on three kinds of groups: (1) groups of people, (2) groups of
computer processors, and (3) groups that include both people and computers.
It seems likely that this kind of general theory of coordination can both draw upon, and contribute to,
work in many different fields, including: economics, computer science, sociology, social psychology,
linguistics, organization theory, and management information systems. Coordination theory will,
therefore, be like other interdisciplinary fields that arise from the recognition of commonalities in
problems that have previously been considered separately in a number of different fields.
For instance, as Figure 2 suggests, the field of cognitive science grew out of the recognition by
researchers in several different fields (e.g., psychology, computer science, linguistics) that they were
dealing separately with similar problems: how can information processing systems (people or
computers) do things like use language, learn, plan, remember, and solve problems? (e.g., see
Norman, 1980; Gardner, 1985). Progress in the new field has benefitted greatly from emergent cross-
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disciplinary connections, and the paradigms used have in turn been quite influential in the older
fields (Gardner, 1985).
Linguistics
/
I \
I
I Cognitive Science I
Figure 2
Both cognitive science and coordination theory
focus on problems previously considered separately in different fields.
In coordination theory (see Figure 2), the common problems have to do with coordination: How can
overall goals be subdivided into tasks? How can tasks be assigned to groups or to individual actors?
How can resources be allocated among different actors? How can information be shared among
different actors to help achieve the overall goals? How can the different knowledge and conflicting
preferences of different actors be combined to arrive at overall goals?
In fact, we can view coordination itself as another prototypical example of intelligent behavior, like
learning, planning, and using language. Most previous work in cognitive science and artificial
intelligence, however, has focused on intelligent behavior by individual actors. By shifting our focus
to the coordination of multiple actors, new problems come into view. For instance: What forms of
coordination allow a group of actors to perform more intelligently than any of its individual
members? How can multiple actors jointly construct robust plans for their cooperative behavior?
How can groups of actors coordinate joint decision-making? How can groups of actors learn new
concepts?
Examples of coordination theory
To illustrate some of the possible connections between fields, Table 1 shows how selected research in
two very different disciplines (economics and artificial intelligence) can be seen in terms of the
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concepts of coordination we have been discussing. Economists, for instance, have devoted a great deal
of attention to mechanisms for allocating resources among actors. Artificial intelligence researchers,
on the other hand, have paid more attention to ways of structuring information flows among actors.
In both cases, benefits may result from combining these insights.
One insight suggested immediately by the table is the following: It has long been axiomatic in
economics that markets are very efficient in their use of information because prices are the only
pieces of information that need to be exchanged in order for resources to be allocated (e.g., Hayek,
1945). Recently, work in artificial intelligence has used the metaphor of a market (with contracts and
bids) as the basis for assigning tasks to processors in a distributed computer network (Smith & Davis,
1981; Malone, Fikes, Grant, Howard, 1987; see also, Stankovic, 1985). These computer systems use
prices to help allocate processing resources to tasks, but they also require that task descriptions (or
product descriptions) be exchanged in order for these resource allocation decisions to be made.
Looking at the analogy in this way makes obvious a restriction on the applicability of the
conventional economic analysis of the problem: In markets where the products being exchanged are
not standard, well-known commodities, not only prices, but also product descriptions need to be
exchanged in order to efficiently allocate resources. The only markets in which only prices need to be-
exchanged are those in which the products being exchanged are all commodities, with descriptions
that are well-known to all buyers and sellers. Thus, this work in computer science suggests an
insight relevant to economics. Computer scientists may also be able to profit further from detailed
economic analyses of different resource allocation schemes (e.g., Hurwicz, 1977; Reiter, 1986).
Economists may also find fertile new ground for analysis in the rich kinds of information sharing
structures studied in artificial intelligence. For instance, in the "blackboard architecture" for
designing artificial intelligence programs (Erman et al, 1980; Nii, 1986), the program contains a
large number of "knowledge sources" or program modules that communicate with each other by
placing the results of their computation on a "blackboard" where any other modules can examine
them. In a system based on a more elaborate "scientific community metaphor" (Kornfeld & Hewitt,
1981), the different program modules post their results for other modules to use and also compete for
computational resources from different "sponsors."
Other disciplines have also done work relevant to a general theory of coordination. For instance,
several organization theorists have identified a tradeoff between coordination and "slack resources".
Organizations with slack resources (such as large inventories or long product development times) can
use them as a "cushion" to reduce the need for close coordination. Conversely, organizations that
don't coordinate well pay a price in wasted resources (Nadler & Tushman, 1988, Galbraith, 1977;
Thompson, 1967). Other organization theorists view coordination mechanisms as a means of dealing
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with external entities that control critical resources (Pfeffer, 1986, 1972; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984;
Pennings, 1980). For instance, mergers and acquisitions can absorb critical resources, while
interlocking boards of directors can co-opt powerful outside interests. One test of the generality of
these theories is the observation that they can apply at several levels. For instance, they apply not
only to inter-firm coordination, but also to coordination between teams within a firm (e.g.,
engineering teams that include representatives of outside interests such as marketing; see Ancona &
Caldwell, 1987).
An extended example of coordination theory and its application
To illustrate some of these points more concretely, we describe in this section an example of how
concepts about coordination can be transported across disciplinary boundaries. In this example, the
design and analysis of distributed computer systems eventually led to abstract theories about
coordination that helped predict how human organizations might change with the widespread use of
information technology.
Distributed computer systems
Our example begins with the "contract nets" computer system mentioned above (Smith & Davis,
1981; Davis & Smith, 1983), developed by researchers working primarily in artificial intelligence. It
draws on common-sense economic knowledge about how markets for competitive bidding contracts
typically work. The system formalizes this knowledge as a sequence of messages to be exchanged by
computer processors sharing tasks in a network. In this system, the "contracts" are arbitrary
computational tasks that can potentially be performed by any of a number of processors on the
network, the "clients" are machines at which these tasks originate, and the "contractors" are
machines that might process the tasks.
In order to assign tasks to processors in this system, a client first broadcasts an announcement
message to all potential contractors. This message includes a description of the task to be performed
and the qualifications required of potential contractors. The potential contractors then use this
information to decide whether to submit a bid on the task. If they decide to bid, their bid message
includes a description of their qualifications and their availability for performing the task. The client
uses these bid messages to decide which contractor should perform the task and then sends an award
message to notify the contractor that has been selected. Finally, the contractor returns a result
message containing the results of the computational task it has performed. One of the desirable
features of this system is its great degree of decentralization and the flexibility it provides for how
both clients and contractors can make their decisions. For instance, clients may select contractors on
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the basis of estimated completion time or the presence of specialized data; contractors may select
tasks to bid on based on the size of the task or how long the task has been waiting.
Based on these ideas, a later system (called Enterprise) was developed to allow personal workstations
connected by a local area network to share tasks (Malone, Fikes, Grant, & Howard, 1987, in press). In
this way, for instance, users can take advantage of the unused processing capacity at idle personal
workstations elsewhere on the network.
In the course of designing this system, we realized that there were several different possible
configurations for it and that these alternative configurations were analogous to different forms of
human organizations. For example, one plausible alternative to having announcement messages
broadcast to all potential contractors would be to have "broker" machines on the network that (1)
received announcements of new tasks to be done, (2) kept track of the capabilities and availability of
contractors, and (3) assigned tasks to available contractors based on priorities and estimated
completion times. This scheme, unlike the original "decentralized market" is analogous to a kind of
'"centralized market." If there are different "brokers" for each different type of contractor (e.g., a
broker for printers, a broker for high speed arithmetic processors, etc.), then this scheme is loosely
analogous to a "functional hierarchy" in a human organization, where there are separate
departments for each kind of task (e.g., marketing, engineering, and manufacturing) with each
department having a manager who is responsible for assigning tasks to different groups or
individuals. Finally, if the machines do not share tasks over the network at all, but instead each
machine has its own facilities for tasks such as printing and arithmetic processing, then this is loosely
analogous to a "product hierarchy" in human organizations in which each product division has its
own separate groups for marketing, manufacturing, engineering, and so forth.
As we will see in the next subsection, these rough analogies suggest a new way of thinking about
alternative ways of coordinating the assignment of tasks to actors.
Analysis of tradeoffs in alternative coordination structures
The next step in our example is the formalization of these intuitions about alternative coordination
structures. In a series of papers (Malone, 1987; Malone & Smith, in press), we developed formal
models to represent: product hierarchies, functional hierarchies, centralized markets, and
decentralized markets. Then we analyzed tradeoffs among these structures in terms of production
costs, coordination costs, and vulnerability costs. These models are unusual in that they include
detailed definitions of the structures at a micro-level and mathematical derivations of comparisons
among them at a macro-level. The mathematical derivations use models of task processing based on
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queueing theory and probability theory. The derivations also include assumptions about the number
of messages that are exchanged in assigning tasks to actors. These assumptions are based on a
generalization of the task assignment process used in the distributed computing systems described
above (e.g., announcement, bid, award, and result).
Clearly there are many important aspects of human organizations and computer systems that are not
captured by these simple quantitative models of coordination structures. In many cases, especially in
human organizations, these "non-quantitative" factors are more important than the simple factors
modeled here. Nevertheless, the simple models help illuminate a surprisingly wide range of
phenomena. For instance, the models are consistent with a number of previous theories about
organizational design (e.g., March & Simon, 1958; Galbraith, 1973; Williamson, 1981) and with major
historical changes in the organizational forms of both human organizations Chandler, 1962, 1977)
and computer systems. They help analyze design alternatives for distributed scheduling systems,
and they suggest ways of analyzing the structural changes associated with introducing new
information technology into organizations (Crowston, Malone, & Lin, 1987: Malone & Smith, 'in
press). In the next subsection, we describe some general insights that result from this last use of the
models.
Application to predicting effects of information technology on organizational structures
One of the simple insights contained in the models is that coordination is itself an activity that has
costs and benefits. Even though there are many other forces that may affect the way coordination is
performed in organizations and markets (e.g., global competition, government regulation, interest
rates), one important factor is clearly its cost. Furthermore, it seems quite plausible to assume that
information technology is likely to significantly reduce the costs of certain kinds of coordination (e.g.,
Crawford, 1982).
Now, using some elementary ideas from microeconomics about substitution and elasticity of demand,
we can make some simple predictions about the possible effects of reducing coordination costs. It is
useful to illustrate these effects by analogy with similar changes in the costs of transportation
induced by the introduction of trains and automobiles:
(1) A "first order" effect of reducing transportation costs with trains and automobiles was simply
some substitution of the new transportation technologies for the old: people began to ride on
trains more and in horse-drawn carriages less.
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(2) A "second order" effect of reducing transportation costs was to increase the amount of
transportation used: people began to travel more when this could be done more cheaply and
conveniently in trains than on foot.
(3) Finally, a "third order" effect was to allow the creation of more "transportation-intensive"
structures: people eventually began to live in distant suburbs and use shopping malls--both
examples of new structures that depended on the widespread availability of cheap and
convenient transportation.
Similarly, we can expect several effects from using new information technologies to reduce the costs
of coordination:
(1) A "first order" effect of reducing coordination costs with information technology may be to
substitute information technology for some human coordination. For instance, it has long
been commonplace to predict that computers will lead to the demise of middle management
because the communication tasks performed by middle managers could be performed less
expensively by computers (e.g., Leavitt & Whisler, 1958). In fact, this prediction has not yet
been fulfilled, perhaps, in part, because of the following second and third order effects.
(2) A "second order" effect of reducing coordination costs may be to increase the overall amount of
coordination used. In some cases, this may overwhelm the first order effect. For instance, in
one case we studied, a computer conferencing system was used to help remove a layer of
middle managers (see Crowston, Malone, & Lin, 1987). Several years later, however, almost
the same number of new positions (for different people at the same grade level) had been
created for staff specialists in the corporate staff group, many of whom were helping to
develop new computer systems. One interpretation of this outcome is that the managerial
resources no longer needed for simple communication tasks could now be applied to more
complex analysis tasks that would not previously have been undertaken.
(3) A "third order" effect of reducing coordination costs may be to encourage a shift toward the
use of more "coordination-intensive" structures. For instance, the following speculative
examples suggest some possibilities:
(a) More adaptive organizations. We have already mentioned how rapid technological change
and global interdependencies are creating increasingly turbulent environments to which
organizations must adapt. It is clear that new information technologies--like many
previous communication technologies (such as telephone, television, and the printing
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press)--have the potential to help this problem by transfering information more rapidly
and less expensively. Unlike previous communication technologies, however, the new
computer-based technologies also have the potential to transfer information more
selectively. Thus, as we will see in the next section, new coordination technologies have
the potential to help reduce information overload by directing information more
accurately to people who want to know it without overloading others. Ultimately, these
new coordination technologies may help speed up the "information metabolism" of
organizations--the speed with which organizations can take in information, move it
around, digest it, and respond to it.
(b) More adhocracies. Another possibility suggested by some of our models (Malone & Smith,
in press) is that the widespread use of information technology can facilitate what some
observers (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Toffler, 1970) have called "adhocracies." Adhocracies
are rapidly changing organizations with shifting project teams, often highly decentralized
networks of autonomous entrepeneurial groups. Electronic media, such as electronic
mail, computer conferencing, and electronic bulletin boards, may help bring together and
then coordinate the people with diverse knowledge and skills that are needed for these-
teams.
(c) More use of markets. A final possibility suggested by our models (Malone, Yates, &
Benjamin, 1987) is that by reducing the costs of coordination, information technology may
lead to an overall shift toward proportionately more use of markets--rather than internal
decisions within firms--to coordinate economic activity. Since, market transactions may
often have higher coordination costs than internal coordination (Williamson, 1981;
Malone, 1987), an overall reduction in the "unit costs" of coordination should reduce the
importance of the dimension on which markets have a disadvantage. This, in turn, should
lead to markets becoming more desirable in situations where internal transactions were
previously favored and thus to (i) more "buying" rather than "making", (ii) less vertical
integration, and (iii) smaller firms. These theoretically motivated predictions are, of
course, testable hypotheses, and one item on the research agenda of this new area could be
to empirically test whether the predictions are already coming true.
As these last examples suggest, one of the most intriguing questions that coordination theory may
help answer is what new kinds of coordination structures will be desirable in the electronically
connected world of the near future. What are the organizational equivalents of suburbs and shopping
malls that information technology may make possible? Which of these new possibilities are likely to
be satisfying places to work and which ones aren't? To understand these new possibilities will require
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major extensions or reformulations of our current theories of organizations, markets, and
management. The coordination theory perspective we have described seems likely to be able to
contribute significantly to this endeavor.
Lessons from this example
We have seen in the above example how the development of abstract coordination theory can be
stimulated by and applied to different kinds of empirical examples--both those involving computer
systems and those involving human organizations. We hope that further work in this
interdisciplinary area will encourage more of this kind of extended interdisciplinary interaction.
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COORDINATION TECHNOLOGY
As the very name "computer" suggests, we usually think of computers as machines for "computing"
things--that is, for taking in information, performing calculations or other manipulations on it, and
then putting out the results of these calculations. This kind of "computing" is essentially a solitary
activity, and many of the most widespread uses of personal computers today focus on supporting
individuals, working alone, on tasks like spreadsheet analysis and word processing.
Now, however, computers are beginning to be connected to each other with more and more extensive
forms of telecommunications technology. Therefore, we now have, for the first time, an opportunity to
use combinations of computing and communications technologies in new ways. We suspect that one
of the most important uses of these new systems in the next few decades will be to help groups of
people coordinate their activities.
In fact, from this perspective it becomes clear that many of the existing uses of computers for tasks
such as accounting, are actually ways of helping large groups of people coordinate their activities. In
short, we suspect that computers in the next few decades may well be remembered, not as a
technology used primarily to "compute" things, but as a technology used primarily to "coordinate"
things--that is, as "coordination technology."
The need to help design new kinds of coordination techology may also be one of the primary driving
forces behind--and one of the primary applications for--the development of coordination theory.
What is coordination technology?
We define coordination technology as any use of technology, especially computer and communications
technology, to help people coordinate their activities. 1 This term seems to succinctly capture the
concepts implied by a number of other terms used recently in both academic and popular writing such
as "computer-supported cooperative work," "groupware," "computer-supported groups," and
"interpersonal computing" (see, for example, Proceedings of Conference on Computer-Supported
Cooperative Work, 1986; Olson, in press; Johansen, 1987; Curtis & Malone, 1987; Greif, in press;
Richman, 1987).
For example, we intend coordination technology to include the support of cooperative activities such
as multiple authors collaborating on the same document (Broderbund, 1986; Trigg, Suchman &
Halasz, 1986) and information sharing via electronic mail and computer conferencing (Malone,
Grant, Turbak, Brobst, & Cohen, 1987; Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). But we also
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intend coordination technology to include support for activities where competition or other conflicts of
interest are paramount such as market transactions (Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987), negotiation
(Nyhart & Goeltner, 1987), and debate (Lowe, 1985).
Coordination technology may include tools to help display, manipulate, and route information in
meetings, either face-to-face meetings (e.g., Stefik, Foster, Bobrow, Kahn, Lanning, & Suchman,
1987; Applegate, Konsynski,& Nunamaker, 1986, Kraemer & King, 1986; DeSanctis & Gallupe,
1987) or meetings of people at a distance from each other (e.g., Sarin & Greif, 1985).
Coordination technology also includes many kinds of delayed communication for tasks such as
tracking commitments people have made to each other (Winograd & Flores, 1986), project
management (Sluizer & Cashman, 1984), and meeting scheduling (e.g., Malone, Grant, Lai, Rao, &
Rosenblitt, 1987). Clearly many different kinds of media can be used in coordination technology
including video (e.g., Goodman & Abel, 1986), audio, graphics, and text.
In addition to these recent examples of using technology in new ways to support non-routine group
tasks (such as writing, decision-making, and project management), coordination technology also
includes support for highly routine kinds of coordination transactions (such as the order entry,
inventory control and other accounting tasks often performed by traditional mainframe computers).
While many of these traditional systems are well understood and not of great research interest, a
better understanding of coordination may lead us to rethink old transaction systems by, for instance,
integrating them with electronic messaging systems for handling non-routine cases (Fikes &
Henderson, 1980; Malone, Grant, Lai, Rao, & Rosenblitt, 1987b), or extending them across firm
boundaries (e.g., Cash & Konsynski, 1985; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987).
One way of categorizing these different coordination technologies is in terms of the characteristics of
their communication such as: time (simultaneous vs. delayed), location (face-to-face vs. distant), and
medium (video, audio, graphics, text, structured data). We believe a more useful taxonomy of
coordination technologies will result from a characterization of different task types which such
systems can support (e.g., designing, authoring, scheduling, decision-making, budgeting, planning,
project management, buying, selling, negotiating), and other task characteristics (e.g., routine vs.
non-routine).
Part of the research agenda of this new field is to develop a principled taxonomy of the kinds of
coordination involved in tasks like these and generative theories about how technology can support
them. This goal is a clear example of the connection between coordination theory and coordination
technology.
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Extended example of coordination technology
To illustrate more concretely some of the possibilities for innovative kinds of coordination technology,
we will describe in more detail a system called the Information Lens. This system was designed,
using ideas from artificial intelligence, to help people share information and coordinate their
activities (see Malone, Grant, Turbak, Brobst, & Cohen, 1987: Malone, Grant, Lai, Rao, & Rosenblitt,
1987)
Information sharing
We define the information sharing problem as one of disseminating information to the actors who will
find it useful without distracting others who will find no value in its contents. Part of the initial
motivation for the Information Lens system came from an abstract coordination theory analysis of the
importance of this problem in creating flexible and adaptive organizations--whether of people or of
computers (see Malone, in press).
There are also, however, more immediate practical reasons to believe that this problem is likely to.
become increasingly important as it becomes both technically and economically feasible for people to
send electronic messages and other documents to large numbers of possible recipients. First, it is
already a common experience in mature computer-based messaging communities for people to feel
flooded with large quantities of electronic "junk mail" (e.g., Denning, 1982; Hiltz & Turoff, 1985). At
the same time, it is also a common experience for people to be ignorant of facts that would facilitate
their work and that are known elsewhere in their organization. The Information Lens helps people
solve both these problems: it helps people filter, sort, and prioritize messages that are already
addressed to them, and it also helps them find useful messages they would not otherwise have
received. Possible applications of systems like this include: (a) helping top managers and their staff
discover patterns in the intelligence reports they receive from the field, (b) helping to route
engineering change notices to appropriate people in different engineering, manufacturing, and other
groups, and (c) helping to quickly find, in a large organization, the people who know the answers to
specialized questions.
A key idea in the Information Lens is that semi-structured message templates can simplify both the
original composition of messages and their subsequent processing. For example, meeting
announcements can be structured as templates that include fields for "date", "time", "place",
"organizer", and "topic", as well as any additional unstructured information.
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More specifically, the Lens system enhances the usual capabilities of an electronic mail system with
four important optional capabilities: (1) Senders can conveniently compose their messages using
structured templates that suggest the kinds of information to be included in the message and likely
alternatives for each kind of information; (2) Receivers can conveniently specify rules to
automatically filter and classify their incoming messages into folders based on the same dimensions
used by senders in constructing messages; (3) Senders can include as an addressee of a message, in
addition to specific individuals or distribution lists, a special mailbox (currently named "Anyone") to
indicate that the sender is willing to have this message automatically redistributed to anyone else
who might be interested: and (4) Receivers can specify rules that find and show messages addressed to
"Anyone" that the receiver would not otherwise have seen.
Messages that include "Anyone" as an addressee are delivered to the explicit addressees as well as to
any additional recipients whose rules select them. Messages can thus be selectively disseminated
only to people who are likely to be interested in them. This framework supports many kinds of
information sharing in addition to straightforward electronic mail. For example, we have recently
begun receiving a daily on-line feed of New York Times articles which already contain fields such as.
subject, priority, and author. The users of our system can now specify rules based on these fields for
selecting and sorting news articles just like their rules for sorting any other kind of message.
Other coordination applications
We have been surprised to find that these semi-structured messages are useful, not only for the
original information sharing application, but also for supporting a variety of other coordination
processes in organizations (see Malone, Grant, Lai, Rao, & Rosenblitt, 1987). For example, when the
system knows the types of messages it is receiving, it can (1) take automatic actions on receiving
certain kinds of messages, and (2) suggest actions that its human users might take on receiving other
kinds of messages. Simple examples of using these capabilities include (1) setting up rules to
automatically forward meeting requests to a secretary who keeps a calendar, and (2) having the
system automatically present its users an option of loading the files specified in "bug fix
announcements." We have also recently used these ideas to implement larger scale demonstration
systems that help people schedule meetings, engage in "computer conferences", and keep track of
tasks they have agreed to do. For instance, simply by creating several new types of messages (e.g.,
"meeting proposal" and "meeting acceptance") and by adding several new kinds of rule actions and
response options (e.g., "accept meeting", "add to calendar"), we created a system specifically designed
to help people schedule meetings.
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RESEARCH AGENDA
In this section, we will present a very preliminary sketch of a research agenda for this new area.
Methodologies
One way of characterizing prospective research projects is in terms of their primary methodologies:
(1) Empirical studies of human coordination. This category can include a variety of empirical
methodologies, such as:
(a) ethnographic field observations of organizational coordination processes,
(b) laboratory experiments with group problem-solving, and
(c) econometric studies of firms and markets as coordination mechanisms.
These studies can be used both to stimulate the development of new theory (e.g., a taxonomy
of coordination processes) and to test existing theories (e.g., the prediction that reducing
coordination cost should lead to a greater proportion of market coordination).
(2) Design of new technologies for supporting human coordination. This category includes
designing new computer and communications systems to support a wide variety of kinds of
coordination tasks at different levels of generality: writing, design, project management,
meetings, decision-making, etc. In some cases, the design of such systems will embody and
make more concrete a prior theory; in other cases, a good idea for system design will stimulate
new theory.
(3) Design and experimentation with new methods for coordinating distributed and parallel
processing computer systems. This category includes experimentation with different methods
for solving the coordination problems that arise in distributed and parallel computer systems
such as synchronization, and task assignment. Again, such experiments may, in some cases
apply previous theories, and in other cases help generate new theories.
(4) Formal representation and analysis of coordination processes. This category can include at
least two kinds of formal modeling:
(a) mathematical modeling. Much of the work in economics falls in this category.
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(c) computer simulations. It may also be useful, in some cases, to use knowledge
representation techniques (such as ideas about inheritance and production rules) as a
theoretical language without actually running simulations.
Questions
Another way of characterizing prospective research in this area is in terms of the kinds of questions it
might answer. For instance, the following questions suggest some important general issues that
transcend individual disciplines:
(1) What are the alternative methods for allocating scarce resources to goals and what are the
relative advantages and disadvantages of these different methods in different situations?
(a) In what ways is the assignment of actors to tasks different from and similar to the more
general allocation of resources to goals?
(b) How can a group of actors select a goal to pursue?
(c) How does the presence of significant conflicts of interest among actors affect the
desirability of different resource allocation methods?
(d) How do different kinds of information processing limitations of actors affect the
desirability of different methods? For example, are some methods appropriate for
coordinating people that would not be appropriate for coordinating computer processors,
and vice versa? What new methods for coordinating people become desirable when
human information processing capacities are augmented by computers?
(2) What are the alternative methods for planning a sequence of interdependent actions by
different actors and what are their relative advantages and disadvantages?
(3) How general are coordination processes?
(a) Are there a number "generic coordination processes" that are found in very many
situations? If so, what are they? For example, are there general heuristics for
coordination that are analogous to the general problem-solving heuristics studied in
cognitive science and artificial inteligence?
(b) To what extent does the ability to coordinate well depend on general knowledge about
coordination as opposed to specific knowledge about particular tasks and situations?
20
CONCLUSIONS
Clearly the questions we have just listed are only the beginning of a set of research issues in the
interdisciplinary study of coordination. However, we believe they illustrate how the notion of
"coordination" provides a set of abstractions that help unify questions previously considered
separately in a variety of different disciplines.
While much work remains to be done, it appears that this approach can build upon much previous
work in these different disciplines to help solve a variety of immediate practical needs, including: (1)
designing computer and communication tools that enable people to work together more effectively, (2)
harnessing the power of multiple computer processors working simultaneously on related problems,
and (3) creating more flexible and more satisfying ways of organizing collective human activity.
21
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FOOTNOTE
1 The term "coordination technology" has been used previously by Harry Stevens and Anatol Holt.
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COORDINATION TECHNOLOGY
As the very name "computer" suggests, we usually think of computers as machines for "computing"
things--that is, for taking in information, performing calculations or other manipulations on it, and
then putting out the results of these calculations. This kind of "computing" is essentially a solitary
activity, and many of the most widespread uses of personal computers today focus on supporting
individuals, working alone, on tasks like spreadsheet analysis and word processing.
Now, however, computers are beginning to be connected to each other with more and more extensive
forms of telecommunications technology. Therefore, we now have, for the first time, an opportunity to
use combinations of computing and communications technologies in new ways. We suspect that one
of the most important uses of these new systems in the next few decades will be to help groups of
people coordinate their activities.
In fact, from this perspective it becomes clear that many of the existing uses of computers for tasks
such as accounting, are actually ways of helping large groups of people coordinate their activities. In
short, we suspect that computers in the next few decades may well be remembered, not as a
technology used primarily to "compute" things, but as a technology used primarily to "coordinate"
things--that is, as "coordination technology."
The need to help design new kinds of coordination techology may also be one of the primary driving
forces behind--and one of the primary applications for--the development of coordination theory.
What is coordination technology?
We define coordination technology as any use of technology, especially computer and communications
technology, to help people coordinate their activities. This term seems to succinctly capture the
concepts implied by a number of other terms used recently in both academic and popular writing such
as "computer-supported cooperative work," "groupware," "computer-supported groups," and
"interpersonal computing" (see, for example, Proceedings of Conference on Computer-Supported
Cooperative Work, 1986; Olson, in press; Johansen, 1987; Curtis & Malone, 1987; Greif, in press;
Richman, 1987).
For example, we intend coordination technology to include the support of cooperative activities such
as multiple authors collaborating on the same document (Broderbund, 1986; Trigg, Suchman &
Halasz, 1986) and information sharing via electronic mail and computer conferencing (Malone,
Grant, Turbak, Brobst, & Cohen, 1987; Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). But we also
FOOTNOTE
1 The term "coordination technology" has been used previously by Harry Stevens and Anatol Holt.
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